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In introduction, Ken Wright and I are both 
Coloradoans, which influences our approach to this 
subject. While a few projects have planned to transfer 
water upstream to Colorado, the majority of projects 
attempt to transfer water downstream. Located at the 
top of the nation, and having developed less of its 
available water than California and Arizona, Colorado 
has little to gain and much to lose from interstate 
water transfers. Thus, we take the approach of looking 
primarily for the obstacles to interstate water 
transfers. This is not to say that interstate 
transfers should never, or will never, happen —  they 
happen all the time. Colorado transfers downstream 
large quantities of water simply as the rivers flow. 
It is not undesirable to have money come back to 
Colorado, particularly to the government, as the water 
flows out of the state. Yet whether one supports or 
opposes interstate water transfers, one must review the 
obstacles to those transfers.
As an overview, we will briefly describe various 
types of proposals and their physical implementation. 
Then we will turn to various sources of law which may 
provide obstacles to interstate transfers of water. We 
discuss these sources of law in different categories, 
starting with the interstate compacts and treaties, 
equitable apportionment, and a discussion of the
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constitution, the commerce clause, and the anti-export 
statutes of states. Then we turn to the federal 
statutes and laws, and state statutes and case law, 
which may inhibit interstate transfers. Finally, I 
will discuss some economic and practical limits and 
inhibitions on interstate water transfers.
I. PHYSICAL PROPOSALS.
Proposals for interstate water transfers range in 
size and scope.
A very limited transfer was discussed in Sporhase 
v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 73 L.Ed.2d
1254 (1982). Sporhase involved the transfer of water
from one well 35 feet on the Nebraska side of the state 
line to 130 acres of corn and beans irrigated on the 
same farm on the Colorado side of the state line. The 
water table in this part of the Ogalalla Aquifer slopes 
at 12.5 feet per mile from Colorado into Kansas, so 
ground water flows from Colorado into Nebraska at a 
rate of about one foot per day. The cone of 
depression, after pumping at a rate of 1,200 gallons 
per minute (gpm) for several months, extends only about 
one-third mile into Nebraska, but extends farther into 
Colorado due to the slope of the water table.
The Galloway Group, Ltd., proposal is an ambitious 
proposal to deliver 300,000 to 500,000 acre-feet per 
year from the Yampa and White Rivers in Colorado down
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the Colorado well over 1,000 miles through the Colorado 
River Aqueduct, and to the San Diego County Water 
Authority. It involves a 40-year proposed lease of 
water to San Diego and the construction of a million 
acre-foot reservoir. Galloway might overfile for a 
reservoir decree and would probably build at the same 
site planned and decreed for the Juniper Reservoir of 
the Colorado River Water Conservation District. In 
contrast to Sporhase's groundwater, the Galloway
proposal involves surface water directly under
interstate compacts. See the attached map showing the 
Colorado River Basin.
Another yet more ambitious water transfer proposal 
is the Great Recycling & Northern Development or "Grand 
Canal," a hundred billion dollar proposal to export 
water from Canada's St. James Bay at the south end of 
Hudson Bay in Canada to Lake Superior on the Great 
Lakes and thence to the arid southwest United States. 
It has the support of Canada's Prime Minister, Brian 
Mulroney. A ten-mile dam across the mouth of St. James 
Bay would separate it from Hudson Bay and turn the bay 
into a freshwater lake. Some 40,000 cubic feet per 
second would be diverted toward the Great Lakes and the 
United States. There have been other proposals to 
bring water from the Great Lakes, leading to proposals 
for an interstate compact to prevent transfers out of 
the Great Lakes.
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Years ago, the Parsons Company North American 
Water & Power Plan would have diverted enormous amounts 
of Alaskan water to the Southwest United States. 
Another massive scheme, to pipe water from the Columbia 
River to the west, was blocked by Washington's Senator 
Jackson, who got a prohibition on the Bureau of 
Reclamation even studying the project.
There are some enormous dams on the Missouri River 
mainstem.1/ Montana's Fort Peck Reservoir, operational 
in 1940, has total storage of 19,000,000 acre-feet. 
North Dakota's Garrison, 1955, stores over 24,000,000 
acre-feet. South Dakota's Oahe, completed in 1962, 
stores over 23,000, 000 acre-feet. The Oahe was at one 
time proposed by Exxon for pumping to Wyoming's Powder 
River Basin for coal use and farther to Colorado's 
Western Slope for oil shale development in the Piceance 
Basin.
Coal and other slurry pipelines have been 
proposed. In 1981, South Dakota authorized the sale of 
water rights from the Missouri River to Energy 
Transportation Systems, Inc. (ETSI), for $9,000,000 a 
year. Newspaper articles described potential payments 
of $1.4 billion to South Dakota. The pipeline was 
intended to stretch from the Oahe Reservoir on the 
Missouri River to around Gillette in Wyoming's Powder 
River Basin and then up to 1,800 miles through Wyoming,
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Colorado, Kansas, and Oklahoma to electric power plants
in Arkansas and Louisiana. The ETSI proposal also
proposed to use water, to the extent necessary, from
the Madison aquifer in South Dakota. Other slurry
pipelines have been proposed in Montana, which led to a
law attempting to outlaw such schemes there, except
2/with legislative approval.
W. R. Grace proposed a two billion dollar 
"aquatrain" pipeline to ship Colorado coal, and perhaps 
other materials, perhaps using recyclable plastic bags, 
to California, perhaps using deep or saline water from 
Colorado.
The range of proposals for transfers of water have 
been from the mundane to the sublime, from the 
reasonable to the ridiculous. Most proposals have
never been accomplished, for a large set of good legal, 
political, and economic reasons. Let us turn then to
some of the inhibitions which would-be transferors of 
water face, beginning with the interstate compacts and 
treaties.
II. TREATIES AND INTERSTATE COMPACTS AND EQUITABLE 
APPORTIONMENT.
Treaties can come into play with international or
interstate water transfers. The treaty with Mexico for
delivery of Colorado River water has been cited as an
inhibition to the quantity of water that can be
transferred by the Galloway Group.3/ Alaskan to
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continental United States or Canadian to United States 
transfers could also be affected by treaties.
Colorado has as many interstate water compacts as 
any state. These interstate compacts have been 
negotiated with the consent of Congress and become 
state statutes of each of the states entering the 
compacts. Within Title 37, Article 61 is the Colorado 
River Compact; Article 62, the Upper Colorado River 
Compact; Article 63, the La Plata River Compact; 
Article 64, the Animas-La Plata Project Compact; 
Article 65, the South Platte River Compact; Article 66, 
the Rio Grande River Compact; Article 67, the 
Republican River Compact; Article 68, the Amended 
Costilla Creek Compact; and Article 69, the Arkansas 
River Compact.
Interstate water transfers are likely, for obvious 
reasons, to occur from water rich areas to water poor 
areas. Some of Colorado's rivers are so 
overappropriated that state statutes and cases would 
essentially prohibit transfers, but compacts could 
still come into play. For example, transfers from 
Kansas to Colorado on the Arkansas River, or even from 
Colorado downstream of the John Martin Reservoir to 
upstream of the John Martin Reservoir, can be inhibited 
by Article V.H. of the Arkansas River Compact, C.R.S. 
§ 37-69-101.4/ Article V.H. requires findings of fact
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by the Compact Administration of non-injury by certain 
of these transfers. Article IV.D. of that Compact also 
can inhibit water transfers which might materially
deplete in usable quantity or availability for use
waters for the water users in Colorado and Kansas.5/ 
These articles would probably come into play if, for 
example, the Amity Canal wished a major upstream or 
downstream transfer of its water rights, as has been 
rumored.
Some compacts allocate specific amounts for 
beneficial use within states and drainages. For 
example, the Republican River Compact, C.R.S. § 37-67- 
101, Article IV, states: "There is hereby allocated
for beneficial consumptive use in Colorado, annually, a 
total of fifty-four thousand, one hundred (54,100) 
acre-feet of water." Colorado's allocation is divided 
among several basins. Arguments would obviously be 
available for opposition to transfers out of Colorado 
that beneficial use is required within each basin, that 
the use must be within the basin and cannot be 
transferred outside the basin or state, particularly by 
a private party.
The Upper Colorado River Compact and the Colorado
River Compact have been extensively analyzed in
connection with the Galloway proposal.6/
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While we cannot go into full detail here, the
analyses, supporting and opposing, show many hurdles to
be overcome by the Galloway Group in its attempt to
deliver water to San Diego. The Colorado River
Compact, C.R.S. § 37-61-101, Article III(a) states:
There is hereby apportioned from the Colorado 
River System in perpetuity to the Upper Basin 
and to the Lower Basin respectively the 
exclusive beneficial consumptive use of 
7,500, 000 acre feet of water per
annum. . . ." [Emphasis is added here and in 
all quotations where emphasis appears.]
Opponents argue that use in San Diego is not a
beneficial consumptive use which can be charged to the
Upper Basin, as the Galloway Group proposes.
Article 111(e), perhaps the most often cited
obstacle, states:
The States of the Upper Division shall not 
withhold water, and the States of the Lower 
Division shall not require the delivery of 
water, which cannot be reasonably be applied 
to domestic and agricultural uses."
The Upper Commission staff analysis concluded, at 22,
"There is no need for a lease agreement to provide what
is required under the terms of Article 111(e)."
Article VIII, the second paragraph, states: "All
other rights to beneficial use of waters of the
Colorado River System shall be satisfied solely from
the water apportioned to that Basin in which they are
situate."
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The Upper Colorado River Compact, C.R.S. § 37-62-
101, also provides arguments against the Galloway
proposal. Article III(a) of the Upper Colorado River
Compact apportions, "from the' upper Colorado river
system in perpetuity to the states of Arizona,
Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming, respectively,
the consumptive use of. . ." 50, 000 acre-feet of water
per annum to Arizona and specified percentages of
remaining Upper Basin water to the other states.
Article III(b)(1) states, "The apportionment is of any
and all man-made depletions;" Article III(b)(2) says,
"Beneficial use is the basis, the measure and the limit
of the right to use;" and Article VI says, "The
Commission shall determine the quantity of the
consumptive use. . . in terms of man-made depletions of
7 /the virgin flow at Lee ferry. . . .
The opponents argue since the man-made depletions 
are to occur in San Diego, the depletions must be 
charged to the Lower Basin and cannot give compact 
credit to the Upper Basin or its individual states. 
Supporters argue that the water stored in the reservoir 
becomes personal property and then can be moved to 
California with consumptive use credit upstream.
Article III(b)(3) of the Upper Compact can be 
argued to mean that any excess available from one 
state's non-use can be used first by another state in
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the Upper Basin. Article IX(a) implies that Upper
Basin reservoirs "for the purpose of. . . storing or
regulating water in an upper signatory state for
consumptive use in a lower signatory state [shall not
be denied] , when such use is within the apportionment
to such lower state made by this compact." California
is not a lower signatory state to the Upper Basin
Compact, but IX(a) implies that storage for consumptive
use in a lower state is not sanctioned unless the lower
state is charged the consumptive use.
A chief argument in favor of states joining
Galloway is, as stated by Galloway: "There is a widely
accepted notion that, despite language in the Compact
to the contrary, there is a time clock running on when
the Upper Basin States must put water to beneficial
use." It is hard to see how a lease between San Diego
and Galloway, or San Diego, Galloway, and the State,
could provide better assurance than Article XVI of the
Upper Compact, which says:
The failure of any state to use the water, or 
any part thereof, the use of which is 
apportioned to it under the terms of this 
compact, shall not constitute a
relinquishment of the right to such use to 
the lower basin or to any other state, nor 
shall it constitute a forfeiture or 
abandonment of such use.
The opposition of every state to the Galloway 
proposal even leads to standing problems on getting 
interpretations of the legal questions involved, for
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example, if actions are needed in the U. S. Supreme 
Court for interpretation. The Galloway proposal has 
been opposed by the Colorado River Board of California, 
the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, 
the Colorado River Commission of Nevada, the New Mexico 
Interstate Stream Commission, the Arizona Water 
Commission, the Governor of the State of Arizona, 
specifically threatening a lawsuit by the State of 
Arizona against any decision by the San Diego County 
Water Authority to contract with the Galloway Group, 
the Utah Board of Water Resources, the Colorado Water 
Conservation Board, and the Upper Colorado River
Commission. In view of this unified opposition, the
Galloway Group at the very least faces a long and 
difficult uphill battle.
Interstate compacts may be interpreted by the
U. S. Supreme Court, or other courts. For example, in 
Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 103 S.Ct. 2558, 77
L.Ed. 2d 1, 51 U.S.L.W. 4805 (1983), the Court
interpreted Article III (a) of the Pecos River Compact, 
which provides: "New Mexico shall not deplete by man's
activities the flow of the Pecos River at the New 
Mexico-Texas state line below an amount which will give 
to Texas a quantity of water equivalent to that 
available to Texas under the 1947 condition." 51 
U.S.L.W. at 4807. This case was under the supervision
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of Special Master and Judge of the U. S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Jean Breitenstein for 
several years, and is now scheduled for trial before 
Special Master Charles Meyers in November 1985. The 
decisions arising from such interpretation may have 
bearing on transfers.
Another source of law for opposition to interstate 
transfers would be equitable apportionment cases,
though these must be interpreted with an eye to any
later decisions or interstate compacts.8/ While the 
Colorado Fuel & Iron Corporation was not attempting an 
interstate sale of water, it was attempting to start 
using water in the upstream state, Colorado, as opposed 
to the historic use in the downstream state, New 
Mexico, in litigation which reached the United States 
Supreme Court as Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176,
103 S.Ct. 539, 74 L.Ed.2d 348 (1982), and ___ U.S.
___, 104 S.Ct. 2433, 81 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984), rehearing
den'd, ___ U.S. ___, 1055 S.Ct. 19, 82 L.Ed.2d 915
(1984). In that case, Colorado's attempt to allow
junior diversions by CF&I of waters of the Vermejo 
River were prevented after equitable apportionment 
litigation between the states. A Special Master 
decided in favor of apportioning Colorado 4,000 acre- 
feet per year on the bases that New Mexico could 
compensate for some or all of the Colorado diversions
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through reasonable water conservation measures and the 
injury, if any, to New Mexico would be outweighed by 
the benefits to Colorado from the diversion. The
United States Supreme Court held, to the contrary, that 
Colorado did not meet its burden of proving, by clear 
and convincing evidence (such as would place in the 
ultimate fact finder an abiding conviction that the 
truth of its factual contentions is "highly probable"), 
that Colorado should receive any of the Vermejo water.
While unusual, federal common law, and
Congressionally mandated apportionment, may also come 
into play.
My former partner, Charles Beise, on behalf of 
Colorado water users, argued over the waters of the 
La Plata River in the U. S. Supreme Court at in 
Hinderlider v. LaPlata River and Cherry Creek Ditch 
Co., 304 U.S. 92, 58 S.Ct. 803, 82 L.Ed. 1202 (1938). 
There federal common law was held to give the U.S. 
Supreme Court jurisdiction to review and overturn the 
Colorado Supreme Court's holding that the Compact 
unconstitutionally took the property right of senior
water users. Rotation of water deliveries by
Colorado's State Engineer, pursuant to compact and
contrary to the water decrees of Colorado, was
approved.
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Congress may vest a federal official, such as the
Secretary of Interior, with the responsibility to 
administer the division of interstate streams. See the 
opinion in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564-
567, 83 S.Ct. 1468, 10 L.Ed.2d 542 (1963), and the
decree, 376 U.S. 340, 84 S.Ct. 755, 11 L.Ed.2d 757 
(1964), in which the Court held, "Congress decided that 
a fair division of the first 7,500,000 acre-feet of 
such mainstem waters would give 4,400,000 acre-feet to 
California, 2,800,00 to Arizona, and 300,000 to Nevada; 
Arizona and California would each get one-half of any 
surplus." (10 L.Ed.2d 588). In such a case,
 obviously, his decisions could form obstacles to 
interstate transfers, as where California has already 
used its 4.4 million acre-feet.
III. THE CONSTITUTION, COMMERCE CLAUSE, AND ANTI-EXPORT 
STATUTES.
Traditionally, many western states have had one of
three types of statutes to prohibit or limit the
exportation of water to other states. Some states have
attempted to prohibit all interstate transportation of
water; others have allowed exportation of water only
upon a reciprocal basis, and some have allowed
exportation of water only upon legislative approval.9/ 
Many of these statutes were based on a theory of 
western state sovereignty over water and the belief and 
reliance on an old Supreme Court case that water was
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not an article of commerce. Thus, they became highly
vulnerable after Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,
458 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 73 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1982),
reversing Nebraska ex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase, 208
Neb. 703, 305 N.W.2d 614 (1981), and saying ". . . that
water is an article of commerce." The case dealt with
groundwater, but the Court's dicta goes beyond
groundwater. H[T]hat water is an article of commerce"
raises, but does not answer, "the question whether
Nebraska statute is unconstitutional." 458 U.S. 955.
The Court found at 959, "The reciprocity requirement
[of the Nebraska statute] does not survive the
'strictest scrutiny' reserved for facially
discriminatory legislation," saying in a footnote:
The reciprocity requirement cannot, of
course, be justified, as a response to 
another state's unreasonable burden on
commerce.
The Sporhase decision has been reported in many law
journal articles.10/
In holding water an article of commerce, the Court 
overruled that old Supreme Court case referred to
above, Hudson County Water Company v, McCarter, 209
U.S. 349, 28 S.Ct. 529, 52 L.Ed. 828 (1908), which had
relied on now overruled Geer v. Connecticut, 16.1 U.S. 
519, 16 S.Ct. 600, 40 L.Ed. 793 (1896). Instead the
Court followed its summary affirmance of City of Altus 
v. Carr, 255 F.Supp. 828 (W.D.Tex.) (summarily
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affirmed), 385 U.S. 35, 87 S.Ct. 240, 17 L.Ed.2d 34
(1966). Presumably, at least now, no one would 
disagree that the water that ends up in a can of Coors 
beer is an article of commerce. See, e.g., C.R.S. 
§ 37-81-103(3). The City of Altus case involved piping 
of underground water from Texas a short distance across 
the Oklahoma border to Altus, where it was needed for
V
domestic and municipal use. The Court found the water 
to be personal property as it crossed the Texas line in 
a pipeline. The facts were really very close in the 
Altus and Sporhase cases.
Opponents to interstate water transfers will argue
a distinction between groundwater in a pipe, such as in
the City of Altus and the Sporhase decisions, or even
in the El Paso vs. New Mexico instance, and massive
surface water transfers subject to tight regulations of
interstate compacts authorized and approved by
Congress. The Sporhase Court recognized this
difference, 458 U.S. at 956:
Second, the legal expectation that under 
certain circumstances each State may restrict 
water within its borders has been fostered 
over the years not only by our equitable 
apportionment decrees, see, e.g., Wyoming v. 
Colorado, 353 U.S. 953, 77 S.Ct. 865, 1
L.Ed. 2d 906 (1957), but also by the
negotiation and enforcement of interstate 
compacts.
Probably the most important point of Sporhase 
v. Nebraska is that not all interstate transfers of
-16-
water are easily prevented by a simple state statute 
against export. Of course, neither does the absence of 
a simple and effective statutory prohibition mean that 
very many entrepreneurs will be successful in 
transferring large amounts of water interstate. Thus 
the source of the title of this article, that there’s 
many a slip 'twixt the cup and the lip.
There are now two important decisions following 
Sporhase v. Nebraska in the El Paso, Texas-New Mexico 
dispute, where Texas seeks New Mexican water for use in 
El Paso; City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F.Supp. 379 
(D. N.M. 1983), appealed to the Tenth Circuit, vacated 
and remanded, and 597 F.Supp. 694 (D. N.M. 1984) . El 
Paso filed with the New Mexico State Engineer 326 
permits to appropriate up to 296,000 acre-feet of water 
annually, which the State Engineer denied on the 
grounds of the New Mexico Constitution, a statute 
essentially prohibiting export of New Mexico 
groundwater, and the Rio Grande Compact. Finding the 
compact inapplicable, the court first found that the 
New Mexico essentially prohibitionary statute did not 
meet the requirements of legitimate interstate commerce 
regulation under the Sporhase decision.
In the second decision, the court analyzed a newer 
New Mexico statute inhibiting export of water, Senate 
Bill 295, passed in 1983. Again, the New Mexico
-17-
District Court concluded, after evaluating the 
statutory six factors, of water shortgages and 
availability water in the two states, applicable only 
to new appropriations of water to be used outside of 
New Mexico, the statute "creates an unconstitutional 
burden on interstate commerce." At 7 08. That the six 
factors would be applied exclusively to water transfers 
to other states was central to the decision.11/ The 
State Engineer is now to consider the 326 applications 
filed by El Paso. Trial is scheduled in March of 1986. 
Ken Wright has been a consulting engineer in that case.
New Mexico was not the only state to pass 
legislation responding to Sporhase. Colorado, for 
example, passed provisions attempting to tie any use of 
surface or groundwater in other states to express 
authorization by interstate compact or credit as a 
delivery to another state pursuant to interstate 
compacts and to beneficial use. The 1983 amendment to 
C.R.S. § 37-81-101(3) requires findings that:
(a) The proposed use of water outside 
this state is expressly authorized by 
interstate compact or credited as a delivery 
to another state pursuant to section 37-81- 
103 Or that the proposed use of water does 
not impair the ability of this state to 
comply with its obligations under any 
judicial decree or interstate compact which 
apportions water between this state and any 
other state or states;
(b) The proposed use of water is not 
inconsistent with the reasonable conservation 
of the water resources of this state; and
-18-
 (c) The proposed use of water will not 
deprive the citizens of this state of the 
beneficial use of waters apportioned to 
Colorado by interstate compact or judicial decree.
An amendment to § 37-81-103(1) prohibits
appropriations or diversions
unless the amount of water so diverted or 
appropriated and transported through or into 
such other state or states is credited as a 
delivery to such other state or states by 
Colorado, or water to which such other state 
or states may be or claim to be entitled from 
such interstate source under an existing 
interstate compact or otherwise. Water mixed 
with other substances in the process of 
forming a slurry for the purpose of 
transporting any substance as a suspended 
solid shall not be deemed to have lost its 
character as water.
Note that while § 101(3) (a) is in the disjunctive, 
using "or"s, that § 103(1) requires compact credit that 
is not currently provided for or recognized by Colorado 
River Basin states.
In 1985, the legislature passed House Bill 1070 in 
Colorado. Its Section 6 would add a new C.R.S. § 37- 
81-104, reading:
To effectuate the purposes of this article, 
the general assembly hereby authorizes a fee 
of fifty dollars per acre-foot to be assessed 
and collected by the state engineer on water 
diverted, carried, stored, or transported in 
this state for beneficial use outside this 
state measured at the point of release from 
storage or at the point of diversion.
Galloway's president and attorney have been quoted
 as not planning to challenge this statute.12/ In
-19
response to a request from State Engineer Jeris
Danielson, Colorado Attorney General Duane Woodard
issued his opinion on September 10, 1985, that this
statute and fee are unconstitutional under the Sporhase
line of decisions. At 11-12, Woodard summarized:
You have asked to what exports of water the 
fee of $50 per acre-foot applies. I conclude 
that the fee cannot lawfully be assessed on 
any water exported from Colorado. First, 
Colorado is not entitled to impose a fee on 
any exports that are authorized by an 
interstate compact or judicial decree or are credited as a delivery by Colorado to another 
state pursuant to a compact or decree. 
Second, the imposition of a fee on water 
diverted, carried, stored, or transported in 
Colorado for use outside the state, when no 
fee is charged for use within the state, 
would violate the Commerce Clause of the 
United States Constitution.
Other states have also attempted to restrict use 
of water outside the state.
Montana has determined that the use of water for 
transportation of coal in a slurry pipeline is harmful 
to the protection and conservation of the state's water 
resources and so the use of water for coal slurry 
transport is not a beneficial use of water. Mont. Code 
Anno., § 85-2-104 (1981).
Colorado's fee on exported water may have been 
inspired in part by Montana's severance tax on coal, 
90% of which is exported from the state, recently 
upheld in Commonwealth v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 101
S.Ct. 2946, 69 L.Ed.2d 884 (1981), reh. den., 453 U.S.
-20-
927, 102 S.Ct. 889, 69 L.Ed.2d 1023 (1981). The chief 
difference between that tax and Colorado's 1985 statute 
assessing a fee on water is that Colorado's fee applied 
only for water "for beneficial use outside this 
state. . . . "
South Dakota requires that the legislature must
approve any application to appropriate water in excess
of 10,000 acre-feet annually. S.D. Comp. Laws Anno.,
§ 46-5-20.1 (Supp. 1982). Some analyses of the post-
Sporhase situation do provide additional guidances as
to what might be done in the way of legislation
following that decision. Potential options include
interstate compacts, denials of appropriation in the
"public interest," in stream use appropriations or
reservations, state appropriations of water for state
use or state agency use, and the imposition of
13/conditions on the right to change uses.—
IV. FEDERAL STATUTES AND LAWS.
Developers must comply with many federal acts to 
accomplish certain major interstate water transfers. 
An example of the kind of analysis which may be 
required is that done by Watkiss & Campbell of Salt 
Lake concerning the Galloway proposal in their letter 
of April 9, 1984, to Mr. Jack Dunlop of Bonneville
Associates. The following is largely a summary of that 
letter.
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The Galloway proposal, for example, would include 
hydroelectric facilities, and so may require permits 
and approvals under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 797, et seq. Under the Federal Power Act, the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") grants 
licenses pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 803(a), which 
provides: 
(a) That the project adopted, . . .
shall be such as in the judgment of the 
Commission will be best adapted to a 
comprehensive plan for improving or
developing a waterway or waterways for the 
use or benefit of interstate or foreign 
commerce, for the improvement and utilization 
of water-powered development, and for other 
beneficial public uses, including
recreational purposes; . . .
See also, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference 
v. FPC, 354 F. 2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert, denied 384
U.S. 941 (1966).
Dams must be approved by the Army Corps of 
Engineers under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act of 
1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1344. Individual 404 permits are
granted on the basis of twelve factors found at 33 
C.F.R. § 320.4, including considerations for wetlands, 
fish and wildlife, water quality, scenic and
recreational values, and a public interest review. The 
litigation of the Public Service Company and Riverside 
Ditch concerning the interaction between permits for 
dam construction under Section 404 and the Endangered 
Species Act is an example of the difficulties a
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developer can find arising out of such 404 process. 
Marshes that might provide resting grounds for whooping 
cranes a few days a year exist 250-300 miles downstream 
on the South Platte in Nebraska from a proposed dam on 
a very small tributary of the South Platte. The 
potential interference with the cranes has stymied the 
damming of a less than 5 c.f.s. tributary of the South 
Platte in Colorado for years. Riverside Irr. Dist. v. 
Stipo, 658 F.2d 762 (1981)? Riverside Irr. Dist. v. 
Andrews, 568 F.Supp. 583 (1983)? Riverside Irr. Dist. 
v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (1985). Even in the third 
decision the Court had not reached the question of 
whether the dam would actually harm the habitat of the 
whooping cranes.
The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4331, requires an environmental impact statement for 
"major federal actions" which might "significantly 
affect the quality of the human environment."
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 661, et seq., requires most applicants who would 
build a dam to consult with federal and state wildlife 
agencies and include in project plans measures for the 
minimization of wildlife losses. This might well bring 
in the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Department 
of Interior, the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, the 
state wildlife agencies, and others.
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§ 1531, et seq., has already demonstrated its power to
The Endangered Species Act of 1 9 7 3 , 16 U.S.C.
shut down even a pet project of a U. S. Senate Majority 
Leader. If the Endangered Species Act could shut down 
the Tellico Dam on account of the snail darters, TVA v. 
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 
(1978), no development interest should assume that it 
can escape the plain language of the Endangered Species 
Act, and in particular, Section 7. Though it was 
amended in 1978, it remains of extreme danger to any 
development interest.
The Galloway proposal involves the historical
habitat of the Colorado squawfish, the bony-tailed
chub, and the humpback chub. One man's trash fish is
another man's salmon. Various of these now endangered
species were periodically deliberately dynamited as
trash fish in Western Colorado. Of the Juniper
Reservoir site, the Environmental Defense Fund
Newsletter of September 1985 says:
The Yampa River is essential habitat for one 
of these [endangered fish] species widely 
known as the "Colorado Salmon" because it 
resembles Pacific Northwest salmon in its 
long spawning migrations. The White River is 
almost as important as the Yampa as a holding 
and rearing ground for these fish. The 
riverine habitats also provide havens for 
countless other species, including the great 
blue heron, golden and bald eagles, sandhill 
crane, and bobcat.
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Attached are lists of some of the species in
14 /Colorado of concern to the Division of Wildlife.— / The
Colorado Water Congress Special Project on threatened
and endangered species is one of the most active
projects in the country attempting to alleviate the
problems to water developers caused by the Endangered 
Species Act.15/
The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1271, 
et seg., requires all federal agencies to give 
consideration to potential wild and scenic river areas 
in the use and development of water resources. 16 
U.S.C. § 1271(d). All the Green River within the State 
of Colorado and the Yampa River within the Dinosaur 
National Monument have been designated by Congress as 
potential additions to the National Wild and Scenic 
River System. 16 U.S.C. § 1276(38), (55).
The Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976, 43 
U.S.C. § 1701, et seg. ("FLPMA"), governs Bureau of
Land Management or National Forest lands involved in
projects. The act applies to all federal, state, and
local departments and agencies and deals with permits 
for all rights of way across public lands. Licenses
are based on policies of multiple use and sustained 
yield. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).
The "law of the river" of the Colorado River goes 
beyond compact law. It includes, for example, the
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Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1 9 6 8 , 43 U.S.C.
§ 1521, et seq., 82 Stat. 887 (Public Law 90-537). 
Pursuant to Section 602(a) of this Act, the Secretary 
of Interior promulgated "Criteria for Coordinated Long- 
Range Operation of the Colorado River Reservoirs" 
(Operating Criteria). These criteria frequently call 
for a minimum release of 8.23 million acre-feet 
(m.a.f.) from Lake Powell. Articles II and III of the 
Operating Criteria deal both with Lake Powell and Lake 
Mead, and look to dry periods of record, estimated 
Upper Basin depletions, the Mexican Treaty, and Lee 
Ferry flows concerning reservoir and river levels and 
releases. Opponents to the Galloway proposal argue it 
violates the Operating Criteria.
In addition, one must also consider the Boulder 
Canyon Project Act of 1928, the Colorado River Storage 
Project Act of 1956, and the seven-party Water
Agreement of 1931.
The Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617, 
45 Stat. 1057, authorizes an apportionment between the 
Lower Basin states and virtually required California to 
limit its annual consumptive use to 4.4 million acre- 
feet of Lower Basin water. Section 617c(a).
The Colorado River Storage Project Act, 43 U.S.C. 
§ 620, et seq. , 70 Stat. 105 (Public Law 84-485) has
led to Upper Basin construction of over 33 m.a.f. of
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storage, including Lake Powell at 20 m.a.f., Flaming 
Gorge at 3 m.a.f., Navajo at 1 m.a.f., and Blue Mesa at 
.7 m.a.f. These reservoirs provide opponents the 
argument that no more storage is practically needed.
V. FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS.
Federal reserved water rights can also take 
priority over new projects. Winters v. U.S., 207 U.S. 
564, 28 S.Ct. 207, 52 L.Ed. 340 (1908); Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), supra. Federal 
reserved rights claimed for Indians have not all been 
adjudicated. New interstate developments, such as the 
Animas-LaPlata Project, may be devoted largely to such 
Indian claims. National forest claims continue to be 
litigated. Of particular importance to the Galloway
Group is the Dinosaur National Monument reserved rights 
claims which are currently on appeal to the Colorado 
Supreme Court. By far the largest reserved rights 
claimed in Colorado are for the Naval Oil Shale 
reserves. The water court has now denied the U.S.
antedation for its claims of up to 200,000 acre-feet a 
year from the mainstream of the Colorado and the matter 
is on appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court. Reserved 
rights may also be claimed for wild and scenic rivers. 
Reserved rights for wilderness areas are being pushed, 
in part by the Sierra Club, though wilderness areas are 
above many developments and tend to preserve water for
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the downstream developers. Colorado Springs' and 
Aurora's Homestake II Project has been delayed for 
years, however, because of wilderness area problems.
VI. STATE ACTS AND LAWS INHIBITING TRANSFERS.
Beyond laws attempting expressly to limit water 
export, there are other state statutes which may well 
limit water transfers. One of the most important
inhibiting the Galloway transfer is the California 
Limitation Act. In response to Section 4(a) of the 
Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, California passed 
the California Limitation Act, March 4, 1929
(Chapter 16, Calif. Stats. 1929, p. 38), in which
California agreed that the annual consumptive use of 
water from the Colorado River for use in the State of 
California should not exceed 4.4 million acre-feet of 
the waters apportioned to the Lower Basin states by the 
Colorado River Compact, plus not more than one-half of 
any excess or surplus waters unapportioned by compact. 
This California statute is also used to argue against 
the Galloway plan.
The state constitutions and statutes setting up 
the priority system are an inhibition on interstate 
water transfer plans on highly appropriated or 
overappropriated rivers. Water and decrees may simply 
be unavailable.16/
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To the extent that water may not be newly 
appropriated for the project but must be changed from 
earlier decrees, all the non-injury requirements of 
change statutes such as C.R.S. § 37-92-305 apply.
Applicants must avoid drying up streams, by 
exchange or otherwise, in ways that would infringe, in 
change or original cases, against the many minimum 
stream flow decrees now held by state agencies such as 
the Colorado Water Conservation Board. See C.R.S.
§ 37-92-102(3).
Applicants must have the necessary intent to 
appropriate water, because speculative projects will 
not be awarded decrees.17/
Water administrators could be uncooperative, and a 
developer could find his water diverted by others, 
inadvertently or even illegally. Dam safety statutes 
could get in the way. Water quality statutes or
decisions could interfere.18/ Pueblo Reservoir faced 
$100 million in claims because it had removed silt (a 
pollutant to some, a ditch and field sealant to others) 
from the steam. A-B Cattle Co. v. U.S., 196 Colo. 539, 
589 P.2d 57 (1979). States now administer many federal
environmental statutes, and can be tougher than the 
United States.
State laws other than water and environmental laws 
can get in the way. Slurry pipeline proposals have
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largely gone dormant after the failure of Congress to
pass statutes giving federal powers of eminent domain
to the pipelines.19/
Legal obstacles, in short, are where you find
them. As ingenious lawyers promote and oppose schemes,
the law will evolve, largely in response to economic
and practical pressures, to which we now turn.
VII. PRACTICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.
Even if a developer can shepherd his proposal
through the formidable legal thicket, practical and
economic problems remain. Ray Moses’ recent talk on
the Galloway proposal summarized: "The real problems
are people problems. There is something in the psyche
of the western pioneer that enrages him when anyone
talks of taking any of his water, whether he is using
 it or not." 20/
One of the most interesting problems for large
Colorado River transfers is whether building an
expensive new dam, about $200 million, makes economic
sense. Hydrologists have agreed since at least the
1950's that the law of diminishing returns makes
additional reservoirs on the Colorado uneconomic, at
least from a basin-wide or national perspective.
Walter Langbein's estimate21/, from 1959, was that:
. . . Any increase in capacity will not 
increase the supply [of usable water in the 
Colorado River system]. Furthermore, this 
optimum is insensitive. There is no
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significant gain in net regulation between 29 
and 78 million acre-feet of capacity . . . .  he gain in regulation to be achieved by 
increasing the . . . capacity appears to be 
largely offset by a corresponding increase in 
evaporation.
His table is printed below. In 1959 the existing 
capacity was 35 m.a.f.; the current capacity is about
36 m.a.f. in the Upper Basin alone, with a total river
system capacity of about 60 m.a.f. ••
Capacity Net
of reser- Annual annual
voirs in evapora­ regula­
system Annual tion tion
Detention (million regulation (million (million
period acre-. (million acre- acre-(years) feet) acre-feet) feet) feet)
1.0.... 2 13 4.7 0.4 4.32.2....  29 6.3 .8 5.5
3.0.... 39 6.8 1.1 5.7
4.0.... 52 7.2 1.4 5.8
5.0.... 65 7.6 1.8 5.86.0.... 78 7.9 2.1 5.8
1Based on annual flow of 13 million acre-feet•
2Approximate present [1959] main-stem development.
These projections do not, of course, deal with the
benefits that might accrue to the region , state,
locality, or developer from use at the new reservoir.
They do suggest, however, that the benefits normally 
obtained by reservoirs which increased dependable basin 
yield, are probably not available here. If another
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Colorado reservoir is not needed to create the 
dependable yield to San Diego, the same result to San 
Diego could be obtained by different administration of 
existing federal reservoirs. One cannot now foresee, 
however, the necessary cooperation among states and 
federal officials to, in effect, transfer space in 
these reservoirs to the credit and large monetary gain 
of Colorado or Galloway.
Other practical problems arise. How does one 
preserve and transport the water claimed? River 
administration may be lax in intervening states, and 
the water may be taken, for example, by poorly 
administered wells. Several state's water
administrators, with little motivation to cooperate, 
must cooperate if Galloway is to succeed. Federal 
administrators of the reservoirs must also cooperate, 
despite questions of power production and payments 
therefor, recreation and loyalty to their own 
reservoirs and their fullness. In the event of flood, 
who spills? Who suffers how much evaporation and 
transit loss? What is the transit time and payments 
for interim storage? Are there necessary exchanges? 




There are many problems with interstate water 
transfers, some of which we have tried to illustrate. 
One can be sure that interstate water transfers will 
draw many objectors and generate many controversies. 
Many of the controversies are separate, and sufficient, 
one by one, to prevent the transfer. That is why many 
more transfers will always be proposed than 
accomplished.
With such a greasy cup, filled with such desirable 
ambrosia, with so many straws already sucking, and so 
many elbows jostling the newly arrived drinker, the 
ancient Greek proverb was surely right that "There's 
many a slip 'twixt the cup and the lip."
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FOOTNOTES
U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, "Lakes in the Mis­
souri River Basin," Vital Statistics.
Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-104 (1981). See Okla.
Stat. Tit. 27, §§ 7.6 and 7.8; C.R.S. § 37-81-
103(1) (1981 Supp.); 1978 Coal Pipeline Act:
Hearings on S. 3046 before the Senate Subcommittee 
on Public Lands and Resources of the Commission on 
Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1978); Martz & Grazis, "Interstate Transfers of 
Water and Water Rights - the Slurry Issue," 23 
Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 33 (1977); Note, Do State 
Restrictions on Water Use by Slurry Lines Violate 
the Commerce Clause, 53 U. Colo. L. Rev. 655 
(1982).
The Mexican Water Treaty of February 3, 1944
(Treaty Series 994, 59 Stat. 1219) partly
determines Colorado River allocations by virtue of 
the Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1512. That treaty also led to the Colorado
River Basin Salinity Control Act, 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1571, "to enable the United States to comply 
with its obligations under the agreement with 
Mexico of August 30, 1973 (Minute No. 242 of the
International Boundary and Water Commission, 
United States and Mexico). . ." and that treaty.
C.R.S. § 37-69-101, Article V.H:
If the usable quantity and availability for use of 
the waters of the Arkansas river to water users in 
Colorado water district 67 and Kansas will be 
thereby materially depleted or adversely affected,
(1) priority rights now decreed to the ditches of 
Colorado water district 67 shall not hereafter be 
transferred to other water districts in Colorado 
or to points of diversion or places of use 
upstream from John Martin dam; and (2) the ditch 
diversion rights from the Arkansas river in 
Colorado water district 67 and of Kansas ditches 
between the state line and Garden City shall not 
hereafter be increased beyond the total present 
rights of said ditches, without the
administration, in either case (1) or (2) , making
findings of fact that no such depletion or adverse 
effect will result from such proposed transfer or 
increase. Notice of legal proceedings for any 
such proposed transfer or increase shall be given 
to the administration in the manner and within the 
time provided by the laws of Colorado or Kansas in 
such cases.
5. C.R.S. § 37-69-101, Article IV.D:
This compact is not intended to impede or prevent 
future beneficial development of the Arkansas 
river basin in Colorado and Kansas by federal or 
state agencies, by private enterprise, or by 
combinations thereof, which may involve
construction of dams, reservoirs and other works 
for the purposes of water utilization and control, 
as well as the improved or prolonged functioning 
of existing works: Provided, that the waters of
the Arkansas river, as defined in article III, 
shall not be materially depleted in usable 
quantity or availability for use to the water 
users in Colorado and Kansas under this compact by 
such future development or construction.
6. Analyses of the Galloway proposal include a letter
of September 11, 1984, from the Galloway Group, 
Ltd. , to Governors Richard D. Lamm of Colorado, 
Scott M. Matheson of Utah, and Ed Herschler of 
Wyoming, with extensive discussion of legal 
issues, a 41-page "Upper Colorado River Commission 
Staff Analysis of The Proposal by Galloway Group, 
Ltd., to Lease Upper Colorado River Basin Water to 
San Diego County Water Authority, November 30, 
1984," a 41-page legal opinion of Watkiss & 
Campbell, Salt Lake City, dated April 9, 1984, in 
a letter to Mr. Jack Dunlop of the Bonneville 
Associates, Inc., of Salt Lake, the Memoranda of 
the Chief Engineer and California Attorney General 
to the Colorado River Board of California of 
October 3, 1984, the Memorandum of the General
Manager and General Counsel of the Metropolitan 
Water District of Southern California of 
October 1, 1984, an 11-page opinion of Jennings,
Engstrand & Henrikson, San Diego, to the Board of 
Directors of San Diego Water Authority dated Octo­
ber 4, 1984; and a 22-page legal opinion of Davis, 
Graham & Stubbs, Denver, to Signal Capital
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Corporation of November 14, 1984. See also a
special report prepared by the Freshwater Society 
of Navarre, Minnesota, entitled, "Water Management 
in Transition 1985." See also an article by 
Richard Simms in the forthcoming proceedings of 
the 31st Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute on 
the Galloway proposal.
We are grateful to John Musick and others for pro­
viding these materials, which form much of the 
basis for this paper.
7. Article VI says in full:
The commission shall determine the quantity of the 
consumptive use of water, which use is apportioned 
by article III hereof, for the upper basin and for 
each state of the upper basin by the inflow- 
outflow method in terms of man-made depletions of 
the virgin flow at Lee ferry, unless the
commission, by unanimous action, shall adopt a 
different method of determination.
8. Interstate equitable apportionment water decisions
include Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 22 S.Ct. 
552, 46 L.Ed. 838 (1902); Kansas v. Colorado, 206
U.S. 46, 27 S.Ct. 655, 51 L.Ed. 956 (1907);
Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 64 S.Ct. 176, 88 
L.Ed. 116 (1943), reh. den., 321 U.S. 803, 64
S.Ct. 633, 88 L.Ed. 1089 (1944); Wyoming v.
Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 42 S.Ct. 552, 66 L.Ed.
999 (1922); reh. den, and decree modified, 260
U.S. 1, 43 S.Ct. 2, 66 L.Ed. 1026 (1922); decree
vacated, 353 U.S. 953, 77 S.Ct. 865, 1 L.Ed.2d 906
(1957); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 83
S.Ct. 1468, 10 L.Ed.2d 542 (1963), decree entered, 
376 U.S. 340, 84 S.Ct. 755, 11 L.Ed.2d 757 (1964); 
decree amended, 383 U.S. 268, 86 S.Ct. 924, 15
L.Ed.2d 743 (1966); disavowed by California v.
U.S., 438 U.S. 645, 98 S.Ct. 2985, 57 L.Ed.2d 1018 
(1973); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 65
S.Ct. 1332, 89 L.Ed 1815 (1945); Missouri v.
Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 21 S.Ct. 331, 45 L.Ed. 497
(1901), 200 U.S. 496, 26 S.Ct. 268, 50 L.Ed. 572
(19 06); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 289 U.S. 710, 53
S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 1465 (1933); Connecticut v,
Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 51 S.Ct. 286, 75
L.Ed. 602 (1931); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S.
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336, 51 S.Ct. 478, 75 L.Ed. 1425 (1931), modified, 
347 U.S. 995, 74 S.Ct. 842, 98 L.Ed. 1127 (1954);
Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 94 S.Ct. 2248, 
41 L.Ed.2d 61 (1974).
9. Clyde, State Prohibitation on the Interstate
Exportation Scarce Water Resources, 53 
U.Colo.L.Rev.529, 530 (1982). Examples were, and
in most instances still are: Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 37-81-101 (1973 & Supp. 1981); see Ch. 706,
L. 1983, apparently repealing § 121 until July 1, 
1985, 85-2-104 (1981); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 46-613.01
(1973), with reciprocity requirement stricken, 
State ex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase, 213 Neb. 484, 
329 N.W. 2d 855 (1983); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 533-515
(1979); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-12-19 (1978),
repealed L. 1983, Ch. 2, § 7; Okla. Stat. Tit. 
27, § 7.6 (West Supp. 1981), a restriction
limiting coal slurry pipelines only; Or. Rev. 
Stat. § 537.810, requiring legislative approval 
for interstate transfers (1979); S.D. Comp. Laws 
Ann. § 46-5-20.1 (supp. 1981); Ut. Stat. Anno. 
§ 73-2-8; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 90.03.300 (1962); 
Wyo. Stat. § 41-3-105, 115 (1977), repealed Laws, 
Ch. 167, § 2.
10. See, e.g. , Corker, "Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel.
Douglas: Does the Dormant Commerce Clause Really
Limit the Power of a State to Forbid (1) The 
Export of Water and (2) The Creation of a Water 
Right to Use in Another State?" 54 U.Colo.L.Rev. 
393 (1983) ; Barnett, "Mixing Water and the
Commerce Clause: The Problems of Practice,
Precedent, and Policy in Sporhase v. Nebraska," 24 
Nat. Res. J. 161 (1984); Tarlock, "So It’s Not 
’Ours' - Why Can't We Still Keep It? A First Look 
at Sporhase v. Nebraska," 18 Land & Water L. Rev. 
137 (1983).
11. Senate Bill 295, N.M. Stat. Ann., § 72-12B-1 (Cum. 
Supp. 1984) , required that the following six 
factors be applied to applications for the 
transportation and use of surface or undeveloped 
water outside, but not inside, New Mexico:
(1) the supply of water available to 
the state of New Mexico;
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(2) water demands of the state of New 
Mexico;
(3) whether there are water shortages 
within the state of New Mexico;
(4) whether the water that is the sub­
ject of the application could feasibly be 
transported to alleviate water shortages in 
the state of New Mexico;
(5) the supply and sources of water 
available to the applicant in the state where 
the applicant intends to use the water; and
(6) the demands placed on the appli­
cant's supply in the state where the 
applicant intends to use the water.
Various articles have also discussed the El Paso 
decision. See , e.q. , Governor's Water Law Study
Committee, DuMars, et al. , "The Impact of Recent 
Court Decisions Concerning Water and Interstate 
Commerce on Water Resources of the State of New 
Mexico," 24 Nat. Res. J. 689 (1984); "Note,
Commerce Clause Curbs State Control of Interstate 
Use of Groundwater: City of El Paso v. Reynolds,"
24 Nat. Res. J. 213 (1984).
12. "Rocky Mountain News," p. 34, Colo. 2-3, May 24, 
1985.
13. Barnett, "Mixing Water and the Commerce Clause:
The Problems of Practice, Precedent, and Policy in 
Sporhase v. Nebraska," 24 Nat. Res. J. 161 (1984); 
Tarlock, "So It’s Not 'Ours' - Why Can't We Still 
Keep It? A First Look at Sporhase v. Nebraska," 
18 Land & Water Law Rev. 137 (1983). See Comment, 
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas: State
Control of Water under the Constraints of the 
Commerce Clause, 18 Land and Water Law Rev. 513
(1983) .
14. For short reports on some of the Endangered
Species Act developments, see 17 Nat. Res. L. 35, 
et seg. (1984) , and Nat. Res. L. Annual Review of 
Significant Activities - 1982, pp. 233, et seg.
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Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co. , 197 Colo. 413,594 P.2d 566 (1979), finding unappropriated water
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Bohn v. Kuiper, 195 Colo. 17, 575 P.2d 402 (1978), 
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priation on the South Platte; with
Lionelle v. Southeastern Colorado Water Con­
servancy District, 676 P.2d 1162 (Colo. 1984), holding against a new appropriation for a 
reservoir on the Arkansas River; and
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District 
v. City of Florence, 688 P.2d 715 (Colo. 1984), 
holding against a new surface appropriation on the Arkansas.
17. In re Bunqer v. Uncompahqre Valley Water Users
Ass'n., 192 Colo. 159, 557 P.2d 389 (1976), Rocky
Mountain Power Co. v. Colo. River U.C.D., 646 P.2d 
383 (Colo. 1982).
18. See, e.q. , City of Westminster v. Illinois and
Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 101 S.Ct. 1784, 68 L.Ed.2d 
114 (1981); State v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 71 S.Ct.
557, __  L.Ed. 2d __  (1981)
19. See, e.q., Coal Pipeline Carriers: Hearings on
H.R. 4370 before the Subcommittee on Surface 
Transportation of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979) .
20. Raphael J. Moses, "The Galloway Question: Is the
Colorado Line a Barrier to the Transfer of Water?" 
July 31, 1985.
21. Langbein, "Water Yield and Storage in the United
States," U. S. Geological Survey Circular 409, particularly p. 4. See similarly, Harrison,
"Potential United States Water-Supply Develop­
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RECOMMENDED STATUS CHANGE
Scientific name Recommended statusCommon name_____________
1. Rio Grande sucker 
2. Central johnny darter
3. Plains orangethroat 
darter
4. Iowa darter 
5. Arkansas River speckled
chub
6 . Northern redbelly dace 
7. Southern redhelly dace 
8 . Plains minnow 
9. Common shiner 
10. River shiner 
11. Suckermouth minnow 
12. Brassy minnow 
13. Stonecat
\14. White pelican
15. Great blue heron








































Pelecanus erythrorhynchos special concern 
Ardea herodias special concern
This species was nominated by a single reviewer and did not go through the 
entire review process. We recommend no status change this year, and a re­
consideration next year.
A T T A C H M E N T  2
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timothy w  Schultz, Vice Chairman• Michael K. Higbee. Secretary*Richard L. Divetbiss, Member *Donald A. Fernandez. Member
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Common Name Scientific Name Present Status (1) Recommended Status Known Location (2)
Suckermouth minnow Phenacobius mirabilis Sport Special Concern South Platte River between Sterling and the 
State Line; has been 
sampled at 12 separate 
sites in that reach
Brassy minnow Hybognathus hankinsoni Sport Special Concern Known to occur in the South Platte Basin
Stonecat Noturus flavus Sport Special Concern Probably occurs in the South Platte Basin
White pelican Pelecanus
erythrorhynchos
Threatened Special Concern Riverside Reservoir, Sterling Reservoir
Great blue heron Ardea herodias Nongame Species Special Concern Known to occur throughout the northern South Platte 
Basin and on the Front 
Range
Black-crowned night heron Nycticorax nycticorax Nongame Special Concern Unknown; is a marsh bird
(1) By statute, practically all species are classified as sport fish in Colorado.
(2) Locations where species are known to occur; they may also occur in other areas.
RECOMMENDED STATUS CHANGE
Common Name Scientific Name Present Status (1) Recommended Status Known Location (2)
Rio Grande sucker Catostomus plebius Sport Special Concern Rio Grande Basin





Threatened Special Concern South Platte Basin













Phoxinus erythrogaster Sport Threatened Near Pueblo at two locations: (a) spring- 
fed slough T2 0 S  R65W, 
Section 33; (b) west of 
Pueblo Blvd. & south 
south of the Arkansas 
River
Plains minnow Hybognathus placitus Sport Special Concern South Platte Basin
Common shiner Notropis cornutus Sport Threatened Known to occur in the South Platte Basin
River shiner Notropis blennius Sport Special Concern Arkansas River warmwater fish
